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Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets 
Joseph E. Stiglitz 
A major problem for institutional enders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence 
in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced. One partial 
solution is peer monitoring: having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor 
the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt. Peer 
monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere. But 
peer monitoring has a cost. It transfers risk from the bank, which is in a better position 
to bear risk, to the cosigner. In a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive 
credit market, this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement 
in borrowers' welfare. 
Difficulties in obtaining capital, and the high cost of capital when it can be 
obtained, may act as important impediments to improvements in productivity. 
Capital markets in the rural sector often appear to be underdeveloped. There 
are traditional moneylenders, but they are often reviled for charging usurious 
rates. The reason for these high rates remains a subject of controversy. There 
are widespread popular views that the rates are exploitative. These views 
implicitly assume that competition is limited. Local moneylenders make use of 
local knowledge, and this local knowledge may explain why competition is so 
limited. More recent views have questioned the extent of exploitation, suggest- 
ing that the high rates are a result of three factors: the high -rates of default, the 
high correlations among defaults, and the high cost of screening loan applicants 
and pursuing delinquent borrowers.1 Because of the importance of local infor- 
mation, moneylenders' loans are generally concentrated within a single geo- 
1. See, for instance, Aleem, this issue. 
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This article is based on earlier work on the general theory of moral hazard (Arnott and Stiglitz 1985, 
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graphical area; the inability to diversify means that the risks they must bear are 
large. 
Both in the rates charged and the institutional arrangements by which loans 
are extended, traditional moneylending appears markedly different from mod- 
ern banking institutions of the form found in more developed economies. As a 
result, many governments have encouraged formal banking institutions to go 
into the rural sector (see Siamwalla and others, and Bell, this issue.) These 
institutions would serve to increase both economic efficiency-by making credit 
more widely available-and equality, by lowering the interest rates which poor 
farmers have to pay. This, it was believed, would be true whether the high 
interest rates reflected exploitation as a result of limited competition, or whether 
they reflected compensation for the undiversified risks which local moneylend- 
ers had to bear. Presumably, these more efficient modern institutions would 
drive out the less efficient local moneylenders. 
As it has turned out-as shown in the articles by Bell, Siamwalla and others, 
and Aleem in this issue-the two groups have not only managed to coexist, but 
the local moneylenders seem able to continue to lend at high interest rates. 
Although the formal lending institutions often have suffered large losses, the 
local moneylenders have not only survived, in some cases they have actually 
thrived. Part of the reason for this is that the formal institutions have not made 
loans available to all farmers who would like them (or have not provided them 
with as much credit as they would like). But another part of the reason may be 
that the local moneylenders have one important advantage over the formal 
institutions: they have more detailed knowledge of the borrowers. They there- 
fore can separate out high-risk and low-risk borrowers and charge them appro- 
priate interest rates; and they can monitor the borrowers more effectively, 
making sure that the funds are used productively and thus lowering the default 
rate.2 (See Aleem for the dramatic contrast in default rates.) 
Of the banking institutions which have been set up to provide credit in the 
rural sector of developing countries, one institution, the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, appears to be a model of success. It makes small loans-the aver- 
age size is approximately seventy dollars. It makes about 475,000 loans a 
month. Its default rate is approximately 2 percent, in contrast to some other 
lenders, which have default rates of between 60 and 70 percent (Lurie 1988). 
There are a number of distinctive characteristics to the Grameen Bank, but the 
one I wish to focus on here is that the loans are made to self-formed groups of 
approximately five farmers, who are mutually responsible for repaying the 
loans. Moreover, other members of the group cannot obtain credit until exist- 
ing loans are repaid.3 
2. The incentive (moral hazard) and selection problems are two of the central problems facing any 
credit market. 
3. Peer monitoring through group loans also appears to be used in some African loan markets and in 
Thailand. (See Migot-Adholla and others, forthcoming and Siamwalla and others, this issue.) 
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Thus, the Grameen Bank is able to exploit the local knowledge of the 
members of the group. It has devised an incentive structure whereby others 
within the village do the monitoring for it. I call this peer monitoring. Else- 
where, Arnott and I (1990) have argued that peer monitoring may be an 
effective way of designing an incentive-monitoring system in the presence of 
costly information.4 
Peer monitoring is not without its cost. The members of the borrowing 
groups in the Grameen Bank bear risks that, in the absence of the monitoring 
problem, could much better be absorbed by the bank. Indeed, in the case of 
borrowing groups, the interdependence among the members of the group is 
artificially created. They have been induced to bear more risks than they 
otherwise would. 
This poses an analytical problem: are the gains, from improved monitoring 
worth the costs of increased interdependence? This is the problem that this 
article sets out to model and answer. The article should be viewed as a first 
attempt at developing a general theory of peer monitoring. Thus the borrowing 
group consists of only two individuals. Moreover, the interdependence is lim- 
ited-they have to pay only a limited amount in the event of default. But even 
this limited amount raises the risk that they must bear. I assume, moreover, 
that the information each member of the group has about each other is essen- 
tially costless; it is a by-product of living near each other. (In more general 
cases, the amount of monitoring will depend on the extent of interdependence, 
so that with only a little interdependence, one may obtain only limited moni- 
toring.) Finally, I assume that the risks of default are independent. In practice, 
they are correlated. The existence of correlation would only strengthen the 
results of this analysis. 
The article is divided into three sections. Section I presents the basic model, 
describing the equilibrium which would emerge in the absence of peer monitor- 
ing. Section II shows how peer monitoring works and explains why it will be 
adopted. Section III provides some concluding remarks. 
I. THE BASIC MODEL 
I assume all individuals have two projects which they can undertake, a 
relatively safe project yielding, if successful, a return of YS(L) when undertaken 
at scale L (measured in dollars of expenditure), and a relatively risky project 
yielding, if successful, a return of YR(L). If a project fails, returns are zero. The 
probability of success for each project is Ps and PR, with Ps > PR. I assume that 
the return is an increasing function of scale, but that the fixed costs, L, associ- 
4. In labor markets workers frequently have much better information about whether peers are 
shirking than do managers. In insurance markets, family members have a much better idea about what 
precautions each is taking against some insured event than does the insurance firm. The principles of 
peer monitoring that are developed here thus have important implications and applications in a variety 
of settings. 
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Figure 1. Relationship between Gross Returns and Investment (Assuming 
Success) for Safe and Risky Projects 
Gross return, Y 
Ys 
L.s l,< Project scale, L 
(dollars of expenditure) 
Note: = fixed costs; R = risky project; S = safe project. 
ated with the risky project are larger: LR > L5. Accordingly, in the relevant 
region, Y' > Ys, as depicted in figure 1. 
Assume that, taking into account the probability of success, the safe project 
always yields a higher return than the risky project: 
Ys(L)ps - (1 + r)L > YR(L)PR - (1 + r)L VL 
where r is the rate of interest. An individual who invests his own funds, 
therefore, will always choose the safe project. An individual who invests bor- 
rowed funds and declares bankruptcy if the project fails, however, will discount 
the cost of funds to reflect the probability of bankruptcy. 
In order to focus on the incentive problem, I assume all individuals are 
identical' and, for simplicity, that the level of effort required by the two 
projects at any given size is identical. Expected utility from undertaking project 
i is, 
(1) V,(L, r) = U[Y,(L) - (1 + r)L]pi - P(e(L)) 
5. If villagers know each other's characteristics, then, in forming peer monitoring groups, there will 
be "assortative mating"; that is, the least likely to default will group together, the next most likely to 
default will group together, and so on, leaving the most likely to default to form a group. Thus the 
assumption that all members of the peer monitoring group are identical can really be viewed as one of 
the equilibrium conditions, which can be derived in a more general setting. 
6. I assume that either the individual has no source of income other than that from the project, or 
that whatever the income is, it is constant and cannot be garnished by the bank if the project fails. 
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Figure 2. Indifference Curves between Loan Size and Interest Rate Charged for 
a Single Project 
Interest 
rate, r 
/ / / ~~~~~~~Increasing utility 
Loan/project scale, L (dollars of expenditure) 
Note: Vi = expected utility from project i, where V,, < VI < V2. 
where U(Y) is the utility of income, U' > 0, U" < 0, and the utility function 
is normalized so that U(O) = 0.7,8 The term P(e(L)) is the disutility of effort e; 
p' > 0, v" > 0. It is assumed that the level of effort required goes up as 
project size increases: e'(L) > 0. The individual's indifference curve for a given 
project (risky or safe) is given in figure 2. This curve gives all the contracts (L, 
r) that yield the borrower the same utility.9 
7. This normalization is a convenient one for the exposition of this article but is in no way essential 
and encounters difficulties, for instance, with constant absolute risk aversion utility functions. 
8. Implicit in this formulation is that the individual's investment in the project is equal to the amount 
that he can borrow, L. The results can be generalized to the case where the amount of his own funds 
that the individual is willing to invest depends on the amount that he can borrow. 
9. I assume that the lender can monitor the borrowing activity of the borrower, ensuring that he 
does not obtain funds elsewhere, though the lender cannot monitor other actions of the borrower. This 
assumption is not entirely satisfactory. While the lender can limit the size of the loan he extends, formal 
lenders often have difficulty enforcing restrictions on loans taken out with other lenders. Thus several 
of the case studies in this issue suggest that while information and other transaction costs imply that the 
borrower has a credit relationship with only one (or at the most, very few) informal lenders, borrowers 
frequently borrow from both formal and informal credit institutions. 
A full analysis of market equilibrium in which formal institutions could not restrict the amount of 
outside loans would take us beyond the scope of this paper. (See Arnott and Stiglitz 1990 for an analysis 
of the analogous problem in the context of insurance markets with moral hazard). Doing so, however, 
would strengthen the case for peer monitoring, because the inability to restrict outside loans will lower 
the level of expected utility attained by the borrower in formal credit markets without peer monitoring. 
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The slope of the indifference curve if the individual undertakes project i is1o 
dr Y' - (1 + r) - v'e'/U'p, 
(2) dL L 
The "switch line" can be defined as those combinations of (L, r) for which 
the individual is indifferent between the two projects; that is: 
(3) VS(L, r) = VR(L, r). 
The switch line is negatively sloped under the plausible condition that, because 
returns to scale are more important for the risky project than for the safe, an 
increase in L, keeping r fixed, makes the risky project more attractive. In the 
relevant region (L > LR), 
(4) a VI< aVR 
aL aLf 
Note that the indifference curve, letting the choice of project vary with the 
terms of the loan contract, is the escalloped shape shown in figure 3A. Above 
the switch line (at high levels of L) the individual undertakes the risky project. 
To see that the switch line is downward-sloping, fix the loan size and note 
that utility decreases with increases in r by the amount LU'pi. Since for the 
risky project U' is lower and pi is lower, the decrease in utility for each increase 
in r is smaller for the risky project. Hence, starting from a value of (L, r) at 
which the borrower is indifferent between undertaking the safe or risky project, 
such as point E in figure 4, an increase in r causes the risky project to dominate 
the safe project. But it was assumed in equation 4 that an increase in L at a 
fixed r increases the expected utility from the risky project more than that from 
the safe project. Therefore, an increase in L must be accompanied by a fall in r 
to leave the borrower indifferent between the two projects, which proves that 
the switch line is negatively sloped. 
The borrower is compensated for the extra risk associated with the risky 
project by a higher return when the project is successful, but the bank is not. 
The risky project has a lower probability of success and, hence, the bank has a 
lower chance of being repaid. Clearly, if the bank could directly control the 
actions of the borrower, it would specify that the borrower undertake the safe 
project. It cannot, and this is the basic problem with incentives in credit 
markets. By controlling the terms of the loan contract, the bank can induce the 
borrower to undertake the safe project. That is, the bank must offer a contract 
which lies on or below the switch line. 
To analyze the market equilibrium one additional set of curves is needed- 
the zero-profit locus. The zero-profit locus can be constructed simply as fol- 
lows. If the borrower undertakes the safe project, the expected return to the 
10. The indifference curve for a given project is "well-behaved" in the relevant region where Y', > 
(1 + r) provided Y' < 0 and d2(i" e')/dL2 > 0. 
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/ / ~~~~~~~~~~~Switch line 
Loan/project scale, L 
Note: Because at larger loan sizes individuals undertake the risky project, the indifference curve- 




_ _ _ _ --- Zero-profit locus 
PIPR (1 + r) = p/p 
B 
P/Ps (L*, r) 
Switch line 
L* Loan/project scale, L 
Note: Market equilibrium occurs at the contract (L*, r*), where profits are zero. It is the largest loan 
size along the zero-profit locus for which individuals are willing to undertake the safe project. The 
variable p = cost of capital; pi = probability of success of project i (i = R, S). 
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Figure 4. Effect of Interest Rates on Utility in Selection of Risky or Safe 
Projects at a Given Loan Size 
Utility, U 
E 
U[YR(L) - (1 + r)L]pR 
U[ Y(L) - (1 + r)L]p, 
Interest rate, r 
Note: L = loan/project size; pi = probability of project success; R = risky project; S = safe project; 
Y = gross return. 
bank is ps(1 + r). If the cost of capital is p, then profits are zero provided 
1 + r = plps. Similarly, if the borrower undertakes the risky project, expected 
profits are zero provided 1 + r = P/PR, The zero-profit locus is thus the 
peculiarly shaped dashed line in figure 3B. 
The market equilibrium is that point on the zero-profit locus which maxi- 
mizes the borrower's expected utility. (It is assumed that the borrower does not 
have alternative sources of credit or, equivalently, that the lender can monitor 
the total amount borrowed by any single individual.) In figure 3B, the equilib- 
rium loan contract is (L *, r*). Clearly, the borrower would like to borrow 
more at the market rate of interest; and if the borrower could credibly commit 
himself to not undertaking the risky project, the lender would be willing to 
lend him a larger amount at that rate. But given that the borrower cannot 
commit himself, and that the lender cannot enforce such a promise, even were 
it made (and the borrower and lender both know that), the lender must limit 
his loan size to L*. 
This is only one of the two forms that credit rationing may take. It also may 
take the form that of a group of identical borrowers, some get loans and some 
don't. The usual argument for why this kind of credit rationing cannot occur 
is that those who have been rationed out of the market offer to pay higher 
interest rates. As they do so, the interest rate gets bid up, until demand for 
funds equals supply. But this argument does not work here, because lenders 
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know that at any interest rate above the switch line, borrowers will undertake 
the risky project. Though the amount borrowers promise to pay is higher, the 
amount they actually pay (on average) is lower.11 
II. PEER MONITORING 
Now assume that every borrower has one (and only one) neighbor who is 
also a borrower. The success of their projects is independent. The two borrow- 
ers can monitor each other. The lender would like each to report if his neighbor 
is using the risky technique. He wants to create an environment in which it is 
in the interests of each to monitor the other and to report any cheating. 
The following is a simple way of doing so. The lender offers a contract in 
which if his neighbor agrees to cosign-in a specific sense to be described 
below-the borrower can obtain a lower interest rate and additional funds. 
The cosigner agrees to pay qL dollars to the lender in the event that the loan 
he has cosigned goes into default-provided, of course, that he himself does 
not go into default. 
Now, the cosigner's expected utility depends on whether his neighbor under- 
takes the risky or the safe project. Given their interdependence and the sym- 
metry we have imposed on the problem, it is reasonable to assume that they 
cooperate; that is, they decide jointly on whether to undertake the safe or the 
risky project, and if they undertake the risky project, they agree not to report 
it.12 
11. This argument is set forth in greater detail in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In the simple model 
presented here, lenders are indifferent o lending any size loan below the switch line, at a given, interest 
rate. But if the model is modified slightly to allow pi to increase slightly with loan size, then below the 
switch line the zero-profit locus is negatively sloped, and lowering the loan size below L* actually 
lowers the expected return to the lender. 
Other modifications to the model, to make it more realistic, provide further reasons why lenders will 
not wish to make small loans, to "underfund" projects. For instance, borrowers often have the discretion 
to take actions which put the lender in a position of choosing to ante up more money or risk the loss of 
everything previously lent. Borrowers thus can "force" lenders to lend them more. See Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) and Hellwig (1977). 
12. The interactions among the individuals which result in this being an equilibrium are not modeled 
in detail. It is easy to construct a game for which this is an equilibrium. For instance, assume that at 
any date at which one side reports that his neighbor has undertaken the risky project, the other side has 
time to report the same information. Then it would not pay either party to renege on the agreement not 
to report. 
More generally, it is reasonable to assume that social sanctions would ensure that they behave 
cooperatively, when each's income depends not only on his own actions but also on those of his 
neighbor. There are natural information assumptions which assure that they cannot cheat on each 
other. 
Throughout, it is assumed that if the borrower cheats on the contract by undertaking the risky 
project, the cosignee can "force" the reversal of the action; for example, the loan contract provides that 
in the event of such cheating, the loan is in default and the lender assumes control and gets all the 
returns. 
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Figure 5. Relationship between Loan Size and Cosignee's Liability at a Fixed 
Level of Expected Utility 
Switch line 
Loan /project scale,/- L t scale, / V, constant with zero bank profits 
Cosignee liability, q 
Note: V, = fixed level of utility from safe project (S). The switch line is the maximum loan size, for 
each q, which induces individuals to undertake the safe project. 
Making the individual cosign his neighbor's loan imposes on him an addi- 
tional risk. Since the zero profit condition ensures that the interest rate will 
adjust to leave the expected return to the bank unchanged-taking into account 
the payment from the cosignee, the effect of the cosignatory provision is to 
induce a mean-preserving spread on the borrower's income at any given level 
of his loan L: if both borrowers are successful, utility is higher; but if one is 
successful and the other is not, the first borrower's utility is lower. To compen- 
sate him for undertaking this additional risk, the lender must provide a larger 
loan. The relationship between the minimum-size loan required to attain a 
given level of expected utility and the magnitude of the cosignee's payment 
rate, q, is depicted in figure 5. Equation A-5 in the appendix shows that at 
q = 0, and given the bank's zero-profit condition 
(5) dL -0 dq j: 
This means that (at low levels of q) the risk burden imposed on the borrower 
by cosigning is exactly compensated by the reduction in the competitive interest 
rate charged. 
The only remaining question is to ascertain what happens to the switch line. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.160.233 on Mon, 22 Apr 2013 15:27:43 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Stiglitz 361 
If the two parties act cooperatively, the switch line is now given by the equation 
(6) U[Ys(L) - (1 + r)L]ps + U[YS(L) - (1 + r - q)L]ps(l - Ps) 
= U[YR(L) - (1 + r)L]p' + U[ YR(L) - (1 + r - q)L]pR(l - PR) 
Equation A-7 in the appendix shows that so long as the condition of equation 
4 is satisfied and the interest rate adjusts as q increases to maintain zero profits 
for the lender, the maximum L at which the individual undertakes the safe 
project increases with q. That is, 
(7) dL 0. 
dq switch line at q = 0 
As shown in figure 5, peer monitoring will be welfare-enhancing: for low 
levels of q, the increase in L which it allows (with borrowers undertaking the 
safe project) is greater than that required to compensate the individual for the 
increase in risk-bearing. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis of the value of peer monitoring suggests some of the ingredients 
in the design of successful peer monitoring systems. First, the members of the 
peer group must be provided with incentives to monitor the actions of their 
peers. In the Grameen Bank this is provided by the fact that members of the 
peer group are jointly liable for repayment of loans, and by the fact that they 
cannot gain access to credit until the debts of the group are discharged. The 
denial of access to further credit can be an effective incentive device, as the 
earlier study of Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) emphasized. 
The Grameen Bank employed small groups. The small size increased the risk 
from a single member's default but increased the incentives for peer monitoring. 
The gains from the latter exceeded the losses from the former. With large 
groups there is a free rider problem-each would prefer that others expend the 
energy required to monitor and incur the ill will that would result from report- 
ing offenders who have misused the funds lent to them. Moreover, the costs to 
each as a result of a default by any member are sufficiently small that incentives 
to monitor-even apart from the free rider problem-would be minimal. 
There are strong incentives for groups with similar risk characteristics to 
form. Because the group acts as a cooperative, if some individual is more prone 
to default than others, he is being subsidized. When groups are identical, there 
is no subsidy (at least in an ex ante sense). Of course, those with high risks of 
default would like to join groups with a low risk of default. The assortative 
grouping comes about as those with the lowest risk of default recognize their 
mutual interest in grouping together; then those with the lowest risk among the 
ones remaining group together; and the process continues until the individuals 
with the highest risk are forced to group together. Villagers have an informa- 
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tional advantage over formal credit institutions not only in monitoring but also 
in selection. By eliminating some of the cross-subsidization that occurs in credit 
markets with imperfect screening, peer selection with substantial cross-guaran- 
tees may enhance the effectiveness of rural credit markets, although, like peer 
monitoring, it increases the risks that borrowers have to bear. Having groups 
which are self-formed may thus be an important ingredient in the success of 
the Grameen Bank. 13 
Provisions for cosigning have traditionally been viewed as a way of increasing 
the effective collateral behind a loan. This article has provided an alternative 
interpretation. Cosigning provides an incentive for the cosignee to monitor the 
actions of the person for whom he has cosigned the loan. Cosigning also 
increases risk. But in the kind of symmetric competitive equilibrium analyzed 
here, interest rates adjust to reflect the improved monitoring. It has been proven 
that at low levels of q, the gains from peer monitoring more than offset the 
loss in expected utility from the increased risk-bearing. 
In developing countries the inability of those outside a village to monitor 
loans has posed a major impediment to the development of effective capital 
markets. Within the village, risks are sufficiently highly correlated and there 
are sufficiently few individuals with wealth that the lending market is both 
imperfectly competitive and carries with it high risk premia. 
Although governments have recognized the existence of a problem, they have 
paid insufficient attention to its root causes. If informational problems are the 
barrier to the development of an effective capital market, then there is no 
reason to presume that governmental lending agencies will be in a superior 
position to address these problems. Indeed, the lack of incentives for govern- 
ment bureaucrats to monitor loans may exacerbate the problem. The experi- 
ence of government losses in such programs (see, for instance, Sanderatne 
1978, and Bell, this issue) suggests that it may be foolish for government to go 
where the market has feared to tread. 
But government may be able to use peer monitoring to offset its informa- 
tional disadvantage. This article has illustrated a simple way by which such 
peer monitoring can be implemented, but there are alternative institutional 
arrangements that could work as well or better. For instance, government could 
lend to small lending cooperatives within a village, making each member of the 
cooperative collectively liable for the whole. 
A question naturally arises at this juncture: if peer monitoring is so effective, 
why isn't it employed by private markets? In capital markets in developed 
countries, it may be extensively employed. As noted above, provisions for 
cosigning may be important not only for the increased effective collateral but 
also for the induced peer monitoring. 
13. There still may be some cross-subsidization across groups if interest rates charged to different 
groups do not correspond to differences in group default rates. Successful peer monitoring, however, 
lowers group default rates to the point where this cross-subsidization may be relatively unimportant. 
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In developing countries a major impediment to the development of peer 
monitoring-as well as to the development of other institutions-comes from 
inadequate legal systems to enforce contracts. Government has one advantage 
over private lenders, a difference which is particularly important in developing 
countries, where the judicial system is at best slow, at worst ineffective. Gov- 
ernment may have powers of enforcing contracts that private lenders might not 
have. 
This suggests an alternative policy reform to more extensive government 
provision of credit: legal reforms giving lenders more security for the recovery 
of their loans. It may, however, be difficult to isolate legal reforms directed at 
making the credit markets more effective from a broader range of legal reforms. 
And there may be serious impediments to undertaking this broader range of 
legal reforms. Although legal reforms can facilitate the use of peer monitoring 
in private markets, even short of such fundamental reforms, well-designed 
government lending programs, taking advantage of the opportunities provided 
by peer monitoring, may, in these circumstances, be an effective second-best 
policy. 
APPENDIX 
No Peer Monitoring 
To simplify the notation, let r -1 + r, the principal and interest charged 
by the bank; Ui= U[Yi(L) - EL], the utility of a borrower who succeeds at 
project i; and i = R, S.14 
Recall that Vi(r, L) = U,pi, the expected utility of a borrower who under- 
takes project i, and the switch line is the set of contractual terms (L, r) for a 
rationed borrower where 
(A-1) V= Vs 
We assume in equation 4 in the text that in the relevant region (L > LR), the 
benefit of an extra dollar of credit is greater for the risky than for the safe 
project: 
(A-2) UR(YR - T)PR - aL aL = U(Ys - T)P 




dr 8L aLJ 
= - ~~< O dL switch line L(UR'PR - US'PS) 
where the sign condition follows from equation A-2 and the fact that PR < PS 
14. Throughout the appendix, the effort required to manage the project is ignored. Incorporating 
the effects of changes in effort induced by changes in loan size is straightforward. 
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and UR < U. Thus the switch line is downward-sloping, as illustrated in 
figure 3. 
Peer Monitoring 
With peer monitoring, the borrower faces in effect three states of the world: 
(1) both his own and his neighbor's projects succeed; (2) his own succeeds but 
his neighbor's fails; and (3) his own fails. Utility in the three states is 
Ui- U[Yi(L) - 'L] 
Uijq U[Yi(L) - 'L - qL] 
U(O) = 0 
Expected utility in a symmetric equilibrium-where both the borrower and his 
neighbor choose the same project, R or S-is 
(A-3) V = U,p2 + Uiqpi(1 - pi) = V(r, L, q) 
Assuming that equilibrium is characterized by credit rationing, the bank 
chooses a contract (r, L, q) that ensures the individual will choose the safe 
project. The bank's zero-profit condition is 
Ps (1 + r) + ps(l -ps)q =p 
so 
(A-4) = -(1 -Ps) dq 
For any r equations A-3 and A-4 define a relationship between the borrower's 
loan limit and the copayment which keeps the borrower's expected utility 
unchanged and is consistent with the bank's zero-profit conditions. That rela- 
tionship is characterized by 
1 dL 
L dq v and the bank's zero-profit condition 
-Up2(J - Ps) + U[gP,Ps(1 - Pi) 
Ul (R'- -)p2 + U;'q(Y' - - q)pi(l - pi) 
-Mi (A-5) dvg/aL 
(A-5') =O if q = O and pi = ps 
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(A-5") > O if q = O and pi = PR 
where 
av, av dr 
M ' + -_ 
aq ar dq 
Equation A-5' yields the result that in an equilibrium in which the borrower 
undertakes the safe project and banks earn zero profits, imposition of a low 
cosigner liability rate q at a fixed loan limit L leaves borrower utility un- 
changed. See the lower curve in figure 5. 
It is useful to write the switch line (equation A-1 or equation 6 above) 
explicitly: 
(A-6) PR UR + PR(1 -PR)Uq = PSUS + pS(J - PS)USq 
Differentiating A-6 totally yields 
dL MR- Ms 
dq switch line aVR/aL - aVS/aLi 
From the assumption stated as equation A-2, the denominator is positive. Using 
A-5' and A-5", respectively, we have that at q = 0, 
MS = 0 
MR < 0 
so 
(A-7) ~dL -MR dq switchlineatqO = ? aVRI8L - aV5/laL 
Equation A-7 shows that peer monitoring shifts up the switch line. It relaxes 
the constraint on (L, r) required to ensure that the borrower undertakes the 
safe project. Comparing A-S' and A-7 indicates that at low levels of q, the shift 
up in the switch line exceeds the shift needed to maintain the borrower at 
constant expected utility, as illustrated in figure 5. Peer monitoring will thus 
increase the borrower's welfare. 
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